RE Field Companies; were they under-resourced?

Some commentators (Nicholson, 2004) have suggested that consistently successful units (such as the Canadian Expeditionary Force) allotted more men and resources to their Engineer Companies than the British. Royal Engineer Unit Diaries between 1914-18 also show that they were constantly improvising weapon systems and tactics, and solving manpower and materials issues. They were doing this in forward areas with limited resources.

Above: improvised systems for destroying wire entanglements, January 1916.

The evidence suggests that many British Army operations hinged on the adequacy of RE preparations in the field. According to official histories, the Passchendaele offensive that commenced on 12th October 1917 was immediately paused, so that transport and communications links could be improved. As the 23rd Division's official history explained, 'Polygon Wood and Nonneboschen were rapidly becoming impassable' comprising 'almost obliterated tracks which led through a wilderness of shell-holes, surrounded by all the hideous wreckage of war' (Sandilands, 1925, p.208). That's why the 102nd Field Company (see main website) and many other RE and Pioneer units were working in the Polygon Wood area of the Salient from 13th October onwards. The 102nd's Division (23rd) was not involved in this attack, but still lost 13 officers and 262 OR killed. As was often the case, the Field Companies were detached and sent where they were needed. So the question is, would a larger and better resourced Field Company cohort have increased British successes?

Royal Engineers laying a track to the front line.